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IN THE
OF THE STATE

COURT
UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

v.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Case No. 19106

LONNIE FERRIS LAWSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

OF THF NATURE OF TFE CASE
Defendant Lonnie Ferris Lawson was convicted by a verdict
before Judge James

s.

Sawaya of criminal homicide, automobile

homicide, a third degree felonv, and also convicted of driving
under the influence of alcohol causing bodilv injury, a Class A
misdemeanor.
DISPOSITION IN THF LOWER COURT
The case was tried before Judge James S. Sawaya.

After a

verdict of guilty was returned, Judge Sawaya sentenced Lawson to
a sentence of zero to five years on the homicide charge and one
year on the Class A Misdemeanor; granted a stav of execution for
two years conditioned on (1) defendant serve one year in the Salt
Lake County Jail;

(2) the court retain jurisdiction;

tution as recommended bv 11.dul t Probation anc' Parole;
full time employment after jail term sentence;

(3) pay resti( 4) maintain

(5) enter and com-

plete alcohol program or any other program deemed appropriate
by Adult Probation and Parole;
places where alcohol is sold;

(6) consume no aocohol or freauent
(7) take antabuse if deemed appro-

priate.
Judge Sawaya sentenced Lawson on Count II, driving under
the influence of alcohol causing bodilv injury, to one vear in
the County Jail to run concurrently with Count I, granted a stav
of execution for two years and placed defendant on Probation under
the same conditions as Count I.
From these sentences defendant filed tinelv notice of
appeal.
RELIEF

01'' APPEAL

Defendant on appeal seeks reversal of the verdicts and
dismissal, or in the alternative, reversal and a new trial.
OF
Clinton Hepner testified (T. 2-35) that on nctober S,
around 7:00 p.m., he picked up his brother's 2807, Datsun which
he had had in his possession for four months hut had stored in
his parents' garage for the last two and one-half months.

The

Datsun would not start so he jump started it and picked up his
girlfriend, Kelly Fehler.

Lights on the Datsun were not

They had dinner at the Hawaiian, and after leavina the restaur3n'
driving to his apartment the car snuttered.
the car sputtered he shifted down to

-
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He stated that whc
low RPMs,

hit the throttle all the wav.

He claimed he was doing this to

get the car going and not hot-rodding it.
When he left the apartment two or three hours later,
the Datsun again would not start.

He and Kelly had to push start

it--he pushing and Kelly at the wheel.

switched sides, with

Hepner at the wheel and drove to get some gas, thinking that water
in the gas tank was one of the problems in the car and that more
gas would alleviate this.
He then drove the Datsun onto the freeway at the 9th South
entrance heading towards Sandy.
belts.

Neither he nor Kelly wore seat-

Though heading for Sandy, he found he had to exit at 33d

South because the Datsun had killed again,
over to the emergency lane.

While on I-15 he pulled

He had been doino 60 MPH on I-15

(T. 15), and was aware of the problems with the power, battery and
gas

(T. 29).
Once in the emergency lane, he stated that he used his

right hand to stop by pulling the emergencv handbrake, used his
left hand to turn off the lights and steered with his kneew (T. 16).
Coming to a complete stop is the last event he remembers that evening.

Hepner testified his foot was on the brake, so his brake

lights were on, but on cross-examination he stated that he had no
lights on the dash inside the car, so he did not know if the brake
lights or directional signal lights were working from the point on
I-15 ,,,here the Datsun's motor killed nor at the time of the acci-

dent.

-
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Orville Peterson testified

35) that on October 8,

as he entered I-80 westbound at 20th South to pick up I-15 headed
south, he observed a Blazer passing him on the left.
about 50 MPH and let the Blazer pass.
on I-15

He was going

He then picked up his speed

and saw the Blazer 100 to 150 feet ahead of him and it

remained the same distance away until it exited at 33d South.
Thereafter, he saw a cloud of dust and saw the Blazer roll.

He

parked his car north of the Blazer which was cross-wise and upside
down in the road.

He saw a man get out of the Blazer window who

appeared dazed and wastalkingunintelligiblv and calling out
names which made him think someone else had been thrown out of the
Blazer.

He than saw the Datsun down by a gullv near a fence, right

side up and facing north, with a male in the driver's seat and
another person in the passenger seat.
Peterson stated he saw the Blazer signal properly as
it changed lanes to go on I-15 from I-80 and also saw the Blazer
use proper directionals as it exited at 33d South.

He stated he

saw no other car exiting on 33d South and did not observe the number of people in the Blazer.
There was conflicting testimony as 1 to the position of the
female passenger in the Datsun.
was in the lap of the driver.

Mr. Peterson believed her head
Jay Bringhurst, one sho stopped tc

give aid, thought she was leaning back against the passenger seat
Vern Olsen, a police officer, thouqht she was leaning over to the
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left side by the steering wheel,
the clutch pedal.

He did not see her head by

Two paramedics thought her head was near the

steering column by the clutch pedal.

Initially, Stephanie

Demetropolis, an emergency medical technician, stopped at the accident, took pulse and blood pressure of the passenger (T. 187).
She testified the blood pressure and pulse were normal though on
a second taking of the blood pressure there was a slight change;
the systolic and diastolic readings were slightly closer together
(T. 194, 199, 201).
Dr. Robert Hood testifiec that he was a qualified neurosurgeon on call for St. Mark's Hospital on October 9, 1983.

Two

patients were brought in around 12:45 a.m. who, he was informed,
had been involved in the same traffic accident.
Upon examining the female patient, he stated she had
irregular, shallow breathing, did not respond to verbal or painful
stimuli and was in an extremely deep coma (T. 79).

There was no

evidence of cuts or bruises and no internal bleeding.

A tube was

inserted in her air passageway to aic breathing together with
the assistance of ventilation from the respiratory therapy crew,
and she was given medications because he, Dr. Hood, assumed she
had massive injuries to the head.

The diagnosis of massive

injury to the head was based upon neurogenic pulmonarv edema,
Results of the CAT scan and cervical spine x-ray showed
there was a subdural hematoma,

-

on the left side surface

5 -

of the brain, but no damage to the gaps and inner spinular gaos
in the muscular structure of the spine.

There were no broken

ribs or injury to the bony structure in the area of the edema
in the lungs.
Dr. Hood's conclusion was, since there was no visible
injury (T. 84), that the patient suffered injury to the nerve
cells in the brain and the brain stem, the lower part of the
brain that connects to the spinal cord where respiratory and
cardiac functions are generated.
tion or autopsy.

There was no postmortem examina-

He, Dr. Hood, concluded that the patient had

forcible movement caused by some shearing force as a result of
a sudden deceleration.
On cross-examination Dr. Hood testified that the subdural
hematoma was not sufficient in itself to cause death.

He also

stated that such hematoma could rarely be caused by an aneurysm
and death could have been caused by destruction of the medulla.
From his examinations he could not tell if the medulla was destroyed.

The damaged medulla could not be caused by a whiplash.

In summary, Dr. Hood could not testify as to the direction of the
trauma to the head and could onlv say that from the CAT scan and
and neurological examination it was a massive trauma to the brair
causing brain contusion and injury but he could not identifv the
nature of the trauma (T. 86-87).

-
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Over objection by defense counsel (T. 233-244) inclusive testimony of Belka was received and the blood sample admitted
into evidence.
Lloyd Belka testified he was the Highway Patrol officer
dispatched to the scene on October 8 around midnight.

When he

arrived there were four people about 30 feet from the Blazer. He
asked thedefendant for identification and observed him to be a
bit confused, disoriented and sMelled the odor of alcohol.

- 7 -

He

He stated the deFennant had slurred soeech, which mav have been
the result of a laceration to the chin which was subseauentlv
sutured at the St. Mark's Hospital.

He also stated the defendant

staggered and he did not believe this was caused by bruises to
the knees

(T. 264, 275).
At this point Belk2 took the defendant to his, Belka's,

vehicle and told him to remain there while he went down to see
the Datsun.

He radioed for extra helo and then accompanied defen-

dant to St. Mark's Hospital.

Belka stated that Mr. Peterson

out that defendant was the driver of the Blazer, but on crossexamination T. 261), said "Ir. Peterson never told him the defendan·
was driving the Blazer.
(T. 262).

No one saw the defendant drivinq the Blaze

No alcohol was discovered in the 8lazer; no

warnings were given the defendant.
to go at 12:12 a.m.

Defendant was no longer free

Sgt. Belka aave consent to draw blood from

the defendant at 1:18 a.rn.

(T. 272) and Miranda warnings were sub-

sequently given by Belka at 1;30 a.rn.

The Blazer was reaistered

in defendant's name (T. 27).
Blood was allegedlv drawn from defendant by Kav Fowler,
a qualified RN, though she could not identify the defendant in
court nor did she know from where the blood was drawn, nor did she
have any knowledge as to the nul'\.her of vials of blood nrawn.

Pre·'

, cutor Harwood attempted to refresh her memorv frol". the transcrli·'
of the oreliminarv hearina

117).

-

'l -

Q:

After having
it, does it refresh your
recollection as to the proceeding?

A:

Not to this particular case.
I am in court
al 1 the time; I am. sorrv. I can't remember
one case from another.

Thereafter, William Stonebraker, Toxicologist for the
Utah State Toxicology Department, testified to the results of a
blood test purportedly the blood test of the defendant's.

He

stated there were two tubes of blood (T. 427) and he did the
blood alcohol determination from one tube (T. 430) by means
of a gas chromatograph.

He received two results.

.141 and .151 percentage of alcohol oer 100 cc.
chromatograph was calibrated.

They were

(T. 435).

The

The standard deviation for the known

solution of .077 was .002 (T. 436, 440), and the standard deviation for the known solution of .197 was .005 (T. 436, 442).

He

ran the two samples of blood with 23 other specimens.
Dr. Brian Finkle took the stand.

He testified he was a

qualified toxicologist, Director of the Center for Human Toxico logy, emploved by the University of Utah '1edical Center.

He

stated that with such a discrepancy of results (.141 and .151)
and the standard deviations testified to by

he

would throw out both test results and run another one as the variation on the two tests was not within either the standard deviation below, to-wit,

.007 with a .002 deviation or a .197 with a

maximum deviation of .005.
Q. bv

Hatch:

Quoting the testimonv at T. 482:
But to check my memory, vour
answer is you wouldn't accept
those basises. You would run
another.
Is that correct?
- 9 -

Q:

Given them just as you have presented them
to me, I would have repeated that analvsis.

A:

Once or twice?

Q:

If the fundamental concept of those standards
is wrong, it wouldn't matter if I did it one
hundred times.
I would still get an unacceptable answer.
The point of mv lenqthy answer
to your question is that there should be a
continuum of error, analvtical error shown
with the line I drew.
Then at any level you
could see whether the test is within or without those limitations.

In other words ....

He also testified that the gas chromatograph is a cornpetent means of testing blood for alcohol given the provisions
that the test is done by somone who is qualified, that the equipment is proper and proper procedure is followed

(T. 472).

Defendant made obiection to the admission of the blood
test run by Mr. Stonebraker on the basis of the State's expert
witness, Dr. Finkle.

The motion was denied. Both sides rested.

Defendant made a motion for directed verdict which was
denied by the court.
The jury found the defendant guilty as charged on both
counts.
POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED REVF.RSIBLE ERROR
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUr-'.BER 18 WHICP
PREJUDICED THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT.

Instructions in a criminal case must be accurate based
and based on the essential elements of the offense charged and
failure to do so is reversible error, State v. Laine, 618 P.2d
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Instruction number 18 on the negligence of another
party either nullifies subsequent instructions number 20 and
21 on proximate cause, or in the alternative, confuses the
jury.
Instruction number 18 states that is no defense that
any victim may have been negligent in one or more respects and
thereby contributed to the cause of the accident (R. 084).
The above instruction precludes the jury from considering any
victim as being a proximate cause of injury and/or death.

By

his own testimony Clinton Hepner stated he took the Datsun onto
the freeway I-15 after he had to jump start it and thereafter
push start it.

The Datsun Sputtered.

All of this occurred

and he still chose to take the automobile onto the freeway at
night.

He stated that after the car killed on the freeway he

did not have lights on the dash, he drove onto the emergency
lane by steering with his knees, braking with his right hand
and turning off the lights, if there were any, by his left hand.
In light of the above actions, to preclude the jury
from considering him as the proximate cause of the accident
cannot be warranted by the evidence.
The court gave instruction number 18 wherein it states:
"In the crimes of automobile homicide and driving
under the influence of alcohol causing bodily
injury it is no defense that any victim may also
have been negligent in one or more respects and
thereby also contributed to the cause of the accident.
The test to be applied is whether you find

- 11 -

from all
gent and
of Kelly
injuries

facts that the defendant was neqlithat said negligence caused the-death
Fehler and proximately caused the
to Clinton Hepner."

Thereafter, the court gave instruction number 19, a
stock instruction, that no inference may arise from the fact
that an unfortunate and fatal accident happened.

Then, the

court gave the defendant's request number 4 as instruction
number 20, a stock instruction on proximate cause.
Instruction number 21 sets forth as follows:
"If you find that defendant was negligent and
that the proximate cause of the alleged harm was
an independent intervening act of a person not
a party to this case, that the defendant in the
exercise of ordinary care could not reasonably
have anticipated as likely to happen, the defendant's original negligence is superseded by the
intervening act and is not the proximate cause
of the alleged harm. However, if in the exercise of ordinary care the defendant should
reasonably have anticipated the intervening act,
it does not supersede his original negligence
or break the chain of proximate causation."
It is pointed out that Mr. Hepner, though a victim, was
not a party to this case, parties being the State of Utah and
the defendant.

This Court has as recently as State v. Ruben,

663 P.2d 445, reiterated that instructions should not be considered in isolation in order to predicate a claiM of error
upon it, but instructions must be read and stand as a connected
whole. It seems difficult to read the two instructions, to-wit,
18 and 20, supra, without confusion arising in the mind of
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reading them, especially jurors not legally trained.

As the

Ruben case, supra, points out, the jury must be given some
guide as to how and when the drinking of intoxicants constitutes
simple negligence.

Agreeing that this being a criminal case

does not come under the comparative negligence doctrine, there
must be some instruction as to when the imbibing of alcohol
becomes simple negligence.

The writer contends that the only

way the jury could read instructions 18 and 20 together would
require them to not consider at all the court's proper instruction on proximate cause.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWHJG THE RESULTS
OF THE BLOOD TEST TO GO TO THE JURY.
In reading the testimony of the toxicologist William
Stonebraker,

who received the vial of blood and tested it, he

ran two tests on the sample along with 23 other samples not related to the case.
.151.

One sample ran .141 and the other sample

He further testified that the standards which at that time

were run on the gas chromatograph apparatus allowed deviations
for a valid test of less than the .01 deviation which resulted
from his two tests of the blood.

Mr. Stonebraker in testifying

as to the tolerances established at the laboratory in which he
worked, at pages 436 and 437 and again on cross-examination at
pages 442 through 450, stated that thev used standards of .072
to .082 for the low control and .185 to .209 for the high control.

They had no

controls in the area wherein the samples
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of the defendant's blood fell.

He admitted that the laboratory's

margin of error is .05% which would make the standard deviation
for the low control .002 and the standard deviation for the high
control .005, and further, at line 2, T. 443:
Q:

Well, the difference between your .141
and your .151 is in excess of your deviation allowance; is it not?

A:

Not for these controls which we figured
the standard deviation on.

Q:

Low control is .002; is that correct?

A:

Well, at any rate, the low figure was
reported.

Q:

That is not what I am talking about.
I
am talking about your standard deviation.

A:

I don't figure a standard deviation on
the unknown specimen, sir.

The State called Dr. Brian Finkle as an expert witness
on toxicology and alcohol in the blood.

Dr. Finkle, after being

given hypothetical questions as to the standards and variations,
testified to concluding that if the tests were over the variations, the proper laboratory procedure would be to throw out
both tests and run another (T. 479).

Despite this testimony

the court, over objection, allowed the lower of the blood alcohol
tests into evidence.
The State recalled toxicologist Stonebraker to try and
rectify his testimony as to their laboratory standards (T. 491,
etc.); however, the State was unable to lay a foundation to admit

-

14 -

the standards brought with him into evidence leaving the testimony of the State's witness, Brian Finkle, to the basis that he
would not admit the lower of the two tests run by Stonebraker,
to-wit,

.141 and .151, but would have to run them over to get

an acceptable blood alcohol.
POINT III
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PUTTING THE DEFENDANT BEHIND THE WHEEL OF THE CAR AT ANY
TIME.
Mr. Peterson, the first witness at the scene, was unable
to identify the person he saw crawling out of the car (T. 44):
Q:

Would you recognize the person if you
saw him again?

A:

I couldn't certify if I could. No.

And at T. 51:
Q:

I see.
You didn't get a good enough view
of the person and you couldn't identify
him?

A:

That is correct.

Mr. Peterson also talked about the person he saw coming
out of the car asking where two other people were, indicating
there had been more than one person occupying the car at the time
of the accident.
Mr. Jay Bringhurst testified that he saw a person he
identified as the defendant crawling out of the window of the
car

53), but never identified that person as the defendant

and never saw hiM driving the car or in control of the automobile.
- 15 -

Sgt. Belka indicated that Mr. Peterson had pointed
out the defendant as the driver of the automobile but stated
on cross-examination that Peterson had not pointed him out as
the driver, see T. 219:

Q:

Who was it who attracted your attention to
him (the defendant)?

A:

Orville Peterson.

Q:

The same Orville Peterson who was here in
court as a witness yesterday?

A:

That is correct.

Then Belka testified (T. 296) that Mr. Bringhurst and Mr.
Peterson indicated to him that Mr. Lawson was the man they saw
in the vehicle but neither indicated they saw him driving. This
leaves only the statement of Mr. Lawson when Sgt. Belka asked
if he was driving the vehicle and he answered "Right", and is
in direct contravention to a long series of cases in Utah
allowing a person to convict himself by his own confession or
admission without a prior foundation showing the elements of
the crime charged.
SUMMARY
It is respectfully requested that the Court consider
the errors in law herein and reverse and remand for a new trial

-
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especially the confusion arising from the instructions as to
negligence and probable cause.

u

DATED this .'2_ (;, - day of September, 198 3.
Respectfully submitted,

Sumner J. Hatch
Attorney for D fendant/Appellant
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